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EXECUTIVE BRIEF
Putting Parent 
Subsidiary 
Relationships Right
Lessons from Japanese corporate groups
and 
As companies grow in size and diversify their operations 
either in domestic markets or overseas, the number of 
subsidiaries tends to increase and the structures of the 
companies become more complex. Nowhere is this trend 
more visible than in the case of Japanese corporate groups, 
a majority of which in 2014 were reported to have 50 or 
more subsidiaries each. Among the largest corporates, 
Sony had 1,240 subsidiaries, Hitachi 1,008, NTT 917, 
Softbank 796, ORIX 766 and Dentsu 707.1
Effective leadership is always a challenge, but managing 
subsidiaries comes with additional complications. Subsidiaries 
operate in the shadow of the larger parent organisation and 
corporate management needs to address both the parent 
organisation’s primary mission and the subsidiaries’ goals. 
Governance, reporting and employee needs and motivation 
must also be balanced across the subsidiaries. All in all, having a 
How do Japanese 
corporate groups manage 
their subsidiaries?
By Akira Mitsumasu
multitude of subsidiaries creates a daunting task of coordinating 
masses of activities across the organisation.
The control and coordination of subsidiaries has become 
increasingly relevant in Japan today where, as pointed out by 
Miyajima and Aoki,2 we are witnessing an increasing number of 
cases of information asymmetries between the corporate head 
office and its many layers of internal organisations and 
subsidiaries. Meanwhile there has been a move toward 
enforced legal responsibility of corporate board members. Statutes 
protecting shareholders now mandate that management and 
boards ensure the appropriateness of activities across the 
organisation. Negligence in monitoring obligations can lead 
to litigation from shareholders. This shift begs the question: 
How can a Japanese corporation effectively control, coordinate 
and manage its subsidiary businesses across the organisation?
 
Effective leadership is always a 
challenge, but managing subsidiaries 
comes with additional complications.
Parent-subsidiary relationships
It is useful to identify and classify the different types of parent-subsidiary 
relationships that exist, and treat them separately rather than generalising 
them as homogenous. Through a series of interviews and discussions with ﬁ ve large 
corporate groups in Japan, I have constructed a conceptual classification based on 
the dependency relationship between the parent company and its subsidiary, which may 
be unilateral or mutual. The relationship is unilateral when the parent depends solely 
on its subsidiary for production inputs, or when the subsidiary depends on its parent 
as the only client and source of revenue. It is mutual when both the parent and the 
subsidiary depend on each other. They may trade either internally within the group, 
externally with outside clients, or engage in both. Figure 1 illustrates how the 
parent-subsidiary relationships can be classiﬁ ed into four main categories.
UNILATERAL DEPENDENCE (TYPE U)
A subsidiary belonging to this type depends on its parent as its main trading partner 
(client) and source of revenue. The subsidiary usually has expertise in one area that 
contributes to the larger product or service value chain of the parent. The parent 
company, however, regards the subsidiary as one of many trading partners (suppliers) 
in the market, and cherry picks between using the subsidiary and market for favourable 
price and quality, whilst also maintaining an acceptable subsidiary utilisation rate. 
In such a situation, the subsidiary typically has weak bargaining power when 
negotiating with its parent, and may strive to be at least as competitive as the market in 
order to win orders. In the case of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, for example, the parent 
company deliberately treated its subsidiary as a Type U so as to enhance the 
subsidiary’s competitiveness and make it at least on par with that of other 
suppliers in the market. However, the parent company may also abuse its 
power by demanding flexibility in production and lower costs such that 
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all profits are absorbed and taken away 
by the parent, in which case the subsidiary 
may lose either a) the incentive to be 
entrepreneurial, b) any retained profits 
earnings and cash ﬂ ow to assume greater 
risk or c) the capital needed to innovate, 
upgrade and remain competitive. Overall, 
less coordination is required between 
the parent company and subsidiary 
because the parent is not dependent 
solely on the subsidiary’s output. 
MUTUAL DEPENDENCE (TYPE M) 
A subsidiary in this quadrant sells its 
goods and services primarily to its parent 
company. The parent too is highly 
dependent on the goods and services its 
subsidiary provides, and may often exert 
control over decision making even on 
matters concerning day-to-day operations. 
Having such a subsidiary helps to 
enhance a firm’s specific specialisation 
whilst also reducing labour costs and 
thereby facilitating cost competitiveness. 
Mutual dependence is often inevitable 
when there are no other suppliers in the 
market that can substitute the functions 
performed by the subsidiary, or when 
there are concerns of proprietary 
technology being copied or imitated.
Of the companies that I have 
interviewed in Japan, many have 
subsidiaries that fall into the Type M 
category. One example is the Japanese 
electronics company, Sharp. Between 
2005 and 2009, when many television 
manufacturers such as Sony, Samsung, 
Philips and LG began to outsource 
their LCD panel production to allow 
for expansion in a growing overseas 
market, Sharp continued to invest in 
and focus on using its in-house produced 
LCDs, which the company believed to be 
technologically advanced and hence crucial 
to its product differentiation strategy. 
The Type M subsidiary may need to 
balance between building firm-specific 
production knowledge within the group 
and acquiring knowledge and new 
technologies that are accessible through 
working with external clients. Lock-in 
and inertia may arise when switching costs 
are high, and appropriate monitoring is 
needed to root out inefﬁ ciencies. Mutual 
dependence deems it necessary for the 
parent and subsidiary to coordinate 
regularly. Decision making may be more 
centralised for Type M relationships. 
DUAL FOCUSED (TYPE D)
A Type D subsidiary sells its goods and 
services mainly to external clients in 
addition to its parent company. Between 
2013 and 2016, Panasonic shifted 
its white goods subsidiaries from Type M 
to Type D as it expanded into the 
business-to-business segment using 
its nanoe generator technology (using 
nano-sized electrostatic atomised water 
particles) which had, until then, been 
used in many of Panasonic’s products 
such as refrigerators, washing machines 
and beauty products.
Under the Type D model, the parent 
company, which is highly dependent 
on its subsidiary’s output, may want to 
exert control over its subsidiary, and 
this may lead to a conflict of interest. 
For example, a subsidiary may wish to 
mobilise its resources to expand sales 
outside the corporate group, but its 
parent company may want the subsidiary 
to reduce its external sales and focus its 
limited resources on the internal supply 
chain. Managers may be transferred 
or seconded from the parent to such 
subsidiaries to act as effective coordinators 
and mediators. 
By having a subsidiary shift more 
towards external sales, both the parent 
and the subsidiary could benefit 
from economies of scope and scale if 
the subsidiary manages to reduce its 
marginal cost of production. Participation 
in the market will also force the 
subsidiary to be more competitive in 
quality and price, and the parent 
company may benefit from such 
external governance and the leveraging 
capabilities of the subsidiary.
Because of the dual pressures that 
a Type-D subsidiary often faces, careful 
coordination and control is required so as 
not to curb the subsidiary’s entrepreneurial 
incentives, whilst ensuring that firm- 
speciﬁ c investments needed for the parent 
company’s business are also maintained. 
INDEPENDENT SUBSIDIARY (TYPE I)
A subsidiary belonging to this type sells 
its goods and services mainly to its 
external clients. The parent too is not 
dependent on the subsidiary’s function 
and sees it as a separate revenue 
generating business within the 
corporate group’s portfolio. 
A subsidiary may initially be 
established as Type M, performing 
speciﬁ c functions within the production 
value chain of the parent’s core business, 
such as manufacturing a certain 
component or performing logistic 
functions that support the corporate 
group’s supply chain. As the subsidiary 
gains experience and expertise in servicing 
its parent company, it gradually develops 
competencies that could be applied to 
other production settings with external 
clients. The subsidiary may eventually 
itself become a core business segment 
within the corporate group, and make 
substantial contributions to consolidated 
revenue. This was the path that Hitachi 
Transport System has taken. It began 
as a Type M subsidiary offering excellent 
logistics solutions and gradually evolved 
over time into a successful Type I 
subsidiary that provides third-party 
logistics and other services to many external 
clients. At Hitachi, better performing 
subsidiaries are granted more discretion 
over decision making and hence have 
more incentive to perform well. A Type 
I subsidiary requires little control and 
coordination. However, the parent 
company may exert control when 
performance drops. 
Using the parent-subsidiary typology 
matrix, companies can identify their 
current parent-subsidiary relationship 
and adjust to better ways of coordinating 
business activities. 
Roadmap to creating a 
successful subsidiary
Although it would be impossible to 
prescribe a one-size-fits-all success 
formula that works for every corporation 
and its subsidiaries, it is possible to 
draw some general implications that 
can be applied towards developing 
mutually beneficial and successful 
p a r e n t - s u b s i d i a r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
The simple roadmap outlined below 
highlights what companies should 
consider when managing subsidiaries.
IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE THE 
CURRENT PARENT-SUBSIDIARY 
RELATIONSHIP FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF BOTH PARTIES
The ﬁ rst step is to evaluate the present 
parent-subsidiary relationship. The role 
of a subsidiary as perceived by the parent 
may be biased, and it is only when 
the perspective of the subsidiary is 
also added that the picture becomes 
complete.  The parent-subsidiary 
matrix allows both the parent and the 
subsidiary to identify issues from their 
respective perspectives, facilitate 
discussions  and foster  shared 
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understanding. Mutual agreement and 
consensus are important characteristics 
of Japanese corporations as they allow 
control and coordination to function 
alongside decentralisation (refer to 
Figure 2).
 
ALIGN PARENT-SUBSIDIARY 
RELATIONSHIP WITH STRATEGY
After having identified the subsidiary 
type based on existing parent subsidiary 
relationship, the next step is to define 
or re-deﬁ ne the role of the subsidiary so 
as to ensure that it is aligned with the 
corporate group’s strategy. A mutually 
agreed solution between the parent and 
the subsidiary may result in the role of 
the subsidiary remaining unchanged, or 
in the subsidiary shifting from one type 
to another.
A key part of this process is to 
recognise and evaluate appropriately the 
capabilities of the subsidiary. As pointed 
out by Birkinshaw and Morrison, parent 
companies are not always aware of their 
subsidiaries’ capabilities.3 In addition, a 
subsidiary’s contributory role within the 
corporate group depends greatly on the 
parent and subsidiary relationship, the 
subsidiary’s initiative and entrepreneurism, 
and the parent’s recognition of the 
subsidiary’s capabilities. Some ways 
to ensure adequate parent-subsidiary 
communication and coordination 
are further explored in Figure 3.
Importantly, a subsidiary’s role is 
not static and often changes along with 
the business environment or with 
expectations from the parent company. 
Cosmetics company Shiseido had a fully-
owned logistics functional subsidiary, 
which specialised in delivering millions 
of product items from factories to 
distribution centres and then to its 
nationwide network of product centres, 
and from there to various retailers and 
retail agents. In 2007, Shiseido’s market 
REACHING MUTUAL CONSENSUS
Parent Company Subsidiary Company
Type U
It is cheaper to procure from the 
market because the product 
has become modularised and 
commoditised. But doing so will 
reduce operations of its subsidiary 
and will incur losses which the 
parent will have to cover.
The parent is the only client, such 
that when it cuts production or 
procurement, the subsidiary loses 
its sole source of revenue. The 
subsidiary has been trying to  nd 
other external clients but has not 
been successful.
Possible Consensus: Parent to transfer skills to the subsidiary to help 
improve productivity so that the subsidiary could gradually shift to 
Type D. Subsidiary to strive to be competitive in the market. If 
improvements are not made within an agreed time frame, the parent 
will close down the subsidiary or use its resources for production in 
another business division.
Type D
Depends heavily on inputs from 
the subsidiary and hence exerts 
centripetal pressure. The parent 
however also bene ts from 
economies of scale its subsidiary 
brings through business with 
external clients.
Although generating healthy 
pro ts, the subsidiary faces 
constant pressure from the 
parent to focus its production 
resources on the parent’s 
products, as well as to cut 
down on investments that are 
considered not  rm-speci c.
Possible Consensus: Give priority to the parent’s product, as the 
corporate group’s core growth driver business.
Type 
M
The subsidiary provides highly 
 rm-speci c products that 
cannot be procured from the 
market. Hence it is not easy to 
determine transaction price for 
there is no market price to allow 
for comparison. The business 
unit is pro table, so there is little 
incentive to stretch its subsidiary’s 
targets.
Business with the parent has 
become routine and there is 
no need to worry about  erce 
competition (which having 
external businesses would entail). 
Although there is no intentional 
milking of pro ts from the parent, 
there is little incentive to innovate.
Possible Consensus: Use non- nancial key performance indicators to 
monitor and motivate performance, as well as monitor the subsidiary’s 
procurement costs.
Type I
Parent noticed that multiple 
business subsidiaries are 
developing and producing 
similar products individually.
Pro table with relatively high 
degree of autonomy. Becoming 
industry leaders in their own  eld.
Possible Consensus: Combine multiple businesses and rebrand the 
corporate group as a fully integrated solutions provider. Decision rights 
to the subsidiary will be contingent upon performance.
FIGURE 2
Mutual agreement and consensus are 
important characteristics of Japanese 
corporations as they allow control and 
coordination to function alongside 
decentralisation.
share started to decline and its logistics 
subsidiary was also struggling to handle 
the company’s logistics requirements 
as customers became more demanding 
and fragmented. At that time, Shiseido’s 
headquarters decided to spin off its 
logistics business and focus all 
investments on its core business. The shift 
from in-house logistics to outsourcing 
helped Shiseido to improve service quality 
and reduce costs by avoiding large ﬁ xed 
investments in the logistics business.  
TAILOR CONTROL AND 
COORDINATION SYSTEMS AND 
MONITOR CHANGES
After having identified the subsidiary 
type, and mutually agreeing on the 
role and commitment of the subsidiary, 
the next important activity would be to 
tailor control and coordination systems 
that would best ﬁ t the parent-subsidiary 
setting (refer to Figure 3). 
Again, there is no one-size-fits-all 
solution and, in reality, many activities 
often entail trade-offs. For example, a 
Type M (mutual dependence) subsidiary 
may become less competitive over 
time because of the absence of market 
discipline and availability of new 
external technologies. Therefore 
periodic evaluation is necessary to see 
whether assigned roles are still valid and 
coherent with the firm’s strategy, or 
whether over time, objectives have 
changed, deeming it necessary to 
revise control and coordination.
The framework thus facilitates 
a continuous, iterative process that 
helps the organisation adapt and 
adjust as it grows, matures and 
f a c e s  n e w  m a r k e t  s i t u a t i o n s . 
Having a  ready framework to 
COORDINATION, DELEGATION AND MANAGEMENT 
BASED ON PARENT-SUBSIDIARY TYPE
Coordination Delegation Relationship
Unilateral 
Dependence 
(Type U) 
Improve 
competitiveness 
such as by 
coaching and 
transferring skills from 
parent company.
Foster 
independence and 
entrepreneurship.
Quasi-market 
like relationship, 
though need also to 
consider utilisation 
and revenue of 
subsidiary.
Mutual 
Dependence 
(Type M)
Work closely to share 
tacit knowledge and 
leverage capabilities 
of subsidiaries.
Because of 
dependency, major 
decisions may be 
centralised. Need 
clear role de nition 
to empower and 
maintain incentives.
Be careful not 
to allow routine 
transactions to 
breed inef ciencies. 
Benchmark market 
prices, and where 
necessary, revise 
trading terms.
Dual Focused 
(Type D)
Control subsidiary 
as both pro t 
and cost centre. 
Decide whether 
scarce resources 
should be used to 
develop  rm-speci c 
competencies for 
the company or for 
external businesses.
Increase control 
when there appears 
to be con icting 
interests that could 
negatively affect the 
overall optimality of 
the corporate group.
Con ict of interest 
may arise because 
of dual pressures 
from internal and 
external businesses. 
Try to mutually agree 
on scenario that 
maximizes group 
performance. 
Independent 
Subsidiary 
(Type I)
Coordination 
focused on portfolio 
management and 
overall optimality. 
Part of the 
subsidiary may be 
severed from the 
subsidiary’s control 
and incorporated 
instead into the 
group’s growth driver 
division.
Delegation 
contingent upon 
performance. 
Despite autonomy 
that is granted to 
the subsidiary, if it 
constitutes a major 
source of revenue 
to the group, then 
decision rights on 
major strategic 
issues may still rest 
with the parent 
company.
Relationship likely 
to be closer if the 
subsidiary is a core 
business or if it 
has synergies with 
the group’s core 
business, and distant 
if it is a non-core 
business. 
FIGURE 3 Source: ‘Control and Coordination of Subsidiaries in Japanese 
Corporate Groups’, Mistumasu (2015)
analyse complicated group management issues allows managers to have 
a better grasp of activities that require attention, continuously update 
and refresh information, and tailor control and coordination measures based on a better 
understanding of evolving parent and subsidiary relationships.
Akira Mitsumasu 
is the Vice President of Marketing and Strategy Research, Asia and Oceania Region, for Japan Airlines
The material for this article is derived from the author’s published b ook “Control and Coordination 
of Subsidiaries in Japanese Corporate Groups” , 2015.
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